| dc.contributor.author | MØLLER, Sofie Christine | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-11T11:16:40Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-11-11T11:16:40Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Kant-Studien, 2013, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 301–320 | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1613-1134 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0022-8877 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/28682 | |
| dc.description | Published Online: 2013-09-01 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | The aim of the present paper is to discuss how the legal metaphors in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason can help us understand the work’s transcendental argumentation. I discuss Dieter Henrich’s claim that legal deductions form a methodological paradigm for all three Critiques that exempts the deductions from following a stringent logical structure. I also consider Rüdiger Bubner’s proposal that the legal metaphors show that the transcendental deduction is a rhetorical argument. On the basis of my own reading of the many different uses of legal analogies in the first Critique, I argue that they cannot form a consistent methodological paradigm as Henrich and Bubner claim. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.relation.isreplacedby | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/48764 | |
| dc.subject | Dieter Henrich | en |
| dc.subject | Transcendental deduction | en |
| dc.subject | Legal deduction | en |
| dc.subject | Argumentation | en |
| dc.title | The Court of Reason in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason | en |
| dc.type | Article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1515/kant-2013-0021 | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |