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dc.contributor.authorHUGHES, Niallen
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-29T11:51:26Z
dc.date.available2014-01-29T11:51:26Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationFlorence : European University Institute, 2013en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/29608
dc.descriptionDefence date: 22 November 2013en
dc.description.abstractThis thesis is a collection of three essays on voting as a means of collective decision- making. The first chapter builds a model of how voters should optimally behave in a legislative election with three parties under plurality rule. I show that, in contrast to single district elections, properties such as polarisation and misaligned voting can be mitigated in legislative elections. The second chapter studies a model of committee decision making where members have career concerns and a principal can choose the level of transparency (how much of the committees decision he can observe). We show that increased transparency leads to a breakdown in information aggregation, but that this may actually increase the principal’s payoff. The theoretical model is then tested in a laboratory experiment. The final chapter introduces a model of legislative bargaining where three parties in the legislature bargain over the formation of government by choosing a policy and a distribution of government perks. I show that when individual politicians are responsible for the policies they implement - that is, those outside of government are not held accountable by voters for the implemented governments policies, while each individual politician in the ruling coalition is - then a given seat distribution can result in almost any two party coalition.
dc.description.tableofcontents-- Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule -- How transparency kills information aggregation (and why that may be good) -- Legislative bargaining with accountabilityen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUIen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhD Thesisen
dc.relation.hasparthttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/45090
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subject.lcshGroup decision making
dc.subject.lcshElections
dc.subject.lcshSocial choice
dc.subject.lcshGame theory
dc.titleThree essays in collective decision makingen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.identifier.doi10.2870/11228
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