dc.contributor.author | HUGHES, Niall | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-01-29T11:51:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-01-29T11:51:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Florence : European University Institute, 2013 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/29608 | |
dc.description | Defence date: 22 November 2013 | en |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis is a collection of three essays on voting as a means of collective decision- making. The first chapter builds a model of how voters should optimally behave in a legislative election with three parties under plurality rule. I show that, in contrast to single district elections, properties such as polarisation and misaligned voting can be mitigated in legislative elections. The second chapter studies a model of committee decision making where members have career concerns and a principal can choose the level of transparency (how much of the committees decision he can observe). We show that increased transparency leads to a breakdown in information aggregation, but that this may actually increase the principal’s payoff. The theoretical model is then tested in a laboratory experiment. The final chapter introduces a model of legislative bargaining where three parties in the legislature bargain over the formation of government by choosing a policy and a distribution of government perks. I show that when individual politicians are responsible for the policies they implement - that is, those outside of government are not held accountable by voters for the implemented governments policies, while each individual politician in the ruling coalition is - then a given seat distribution can result in almost any two party coalition. | |
dc.description.tableofcontents | -- Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule
-- How transparency kills information aggregation (and why that may be good)
-- Legislative bargaining with accountability | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | ECO | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | PhD Thesis | en |
dc.relation.haspart | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/45090 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.subject.lcsh | Group decision making | |
dc.subject.lcsh | Elections | |
dc.subject.lcsh | Social choice | |
dc.subject.lcsh | Game theory | |
dc.title | Three essays in collective decision making | en |
dc.type | Thesis | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2870/11228 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |