A sufficientist approach to reasonableness in legal decision-making and judicial review
Title: A sufficientist approach to reasonableness in legal decision-making and judicial review
Author: SARTOR, Giovanni
Citation: Giorgio BONGIOVANNI, Giovanni SARTOR and Chiara VALENTINI (eds), Reasonableness and law, New York: Springer, 2009, Law and Philosophy Library, 86, pp. 17-68
ISBN: 9781402084997; 9781402085000
I shall argue for a sufficientist understanding of reasonableness in legal decision-making: cognitive or moral optimality are not required for reasonableness; what needed is just that a determination—be it epistemic or practical—is sufficiently good (acceptable, or at least not unacceptable). Correspondingly, judicial review on the ground of unreasonableness requires more than mere suboptimality: it requires failure to achieve the reasonableness threshold.
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