dc.contributor.author | SARTOR, Giovanni | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-03-18T11:22:07Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-03-18T11:22:07Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Giorgio BONGIOVANNI, Giovanni SARTOR and Chiara VALENTINI (eds), Reasonableness and law, New York: Springer, 2009, Law and Philosophy Library, 86, pp. 17-68 | en |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781402084997 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781402085000 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/30407 | |
dc.description.abstract | I shall argue for a sufficientist understanding of reasonableness in legal decision-making: cognitive or moral optimality are not required for reasonableness; what needed is just that a determination—be it epistemic or practical—is sufficiently good (acceptable, or at least not unacceptable). Correspondingly, judicial review on the ground of unreasonableness requires more than mere suboptimality: it requires failure to achieve the reasonableness threshold. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.title | A sufficientist approach to reasonableness in legal decision-making and judicial review | en |
dc.type | Contribution to book | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/978-1-4020-8500-0_2 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |