Why lawyers are nice (or nasty) : a game-theoretical argumentation exercise
Title: Why lawyers are nice (or nasty) : a game-theoretical argumentation exercise
Citation: Carole HAFNER (ed.), Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Artificial Intelligence and law, New York : ACM, 2009, pp. 108-119
This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.
Table of Contents:
(Published version of EUI LAW WP 2009/08.)
Initial version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/12320
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