Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorLAUKYTE, Migle
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-19T10:10:31Z
dc.date.available2014-03-19T10:10:31Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationAlessandra MALERBA, Laura MASSOCCHI and Amedeo SANTOSUOSSO (eds), 2012 Law & science young scholars informal symposium : book of papers, Pavia : Pavia University Press, 2013, pp. 101–116en
dc.identifier.isbn9788896764411
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/30458
dc.description.abstractWe have yet to see an artificial entity that can be described as intelligent in the similar way as a human is. But we can look ahead to a scenario in which that prediction comes true—it’s just too bad that all the metaphors we have for thinking about the attendant issues seem to pit humans against artificial entities. I submit, by contrast, that we should view ourselves as sharing a space with these entities: we should consider our own liability for actions that could bring harm to them, and we can appreciate as much if we only look at our relation to animals. I argue that we can draw on that relation to better frame our relation to artificial entities.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.urihttp://archivio.paviauniversitypress.it/atti/YS-2012/en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titleTwo approaches to issues of liability involving artificially intelligent beingsen
dc.typeContribution to booken


Files associated with this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record