dc.contributor.author | LAUKYTE, Migle | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-03-19T10:10:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-03-19T10:10:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Alessandra MALERBA, Laura MASSOCCHI and Amedeo SANTOSUOSSO (eds), 2012 Law & science young scholars informal symposium : book of papers, Pavia : Pavia University Press, 2013, pp. 101–116 | en |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9788896764411 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/30458 | |
dc.description.abstract | We have yet to see an artificial entity that can be described as intelligent in the similar way as a human is. But we can look ahead to a scenario in which that prediction comes true—it’s just too bad that all the metaphors we have for thinking about the attendant issues seem to pit humans against artificial entities. I submit, by contrast, that we should view ourselves as sharing a space with these entities: we should consider our own liability for actions that could bring harm to them, and we can appreciate as much if we only look at our relation to animals. I argue that we can draw on that relation to better frame our relation to artificial entities. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.uri | http://archivio.paviauniversitypress.it/atti/YS-2012/ | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.title | Two approaches to issues of liability involving artificially intelligent beings | en |
dc.type | Contribution to book | en |