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dc.contributor.authorMORELLI, Massimo
dc.contributor.authorYANG, Huanxing
dc.contributor.authorYE, Lixin
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-31T15:20:29Z
dc.date.available2014-03-31T15:20:29Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics, 2012, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 142-175en
dc.identifier.issn1945-7715
dc.identifier.issn1945-7707
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/30727
dc.description.abstractIn an economy where agents have different productivities and mobility, we compare a unified nonlinear optimal taxation with the equilibrium taxation that would be chosen by two competing tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two states. The overall level of progressivity and redistribution is unambiguously lower under competitive taxation; the “rich” are always in favor of competing authorities, whereas the “poor” are always in favor of unified taxation; the preferences of the middle class depend on the initial conditions in terms of the distribution of abilities, the relative power of the various classes, and mobility costs.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomicsen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/13666
dc.titleCompetitive nonlinear taxation and constitutional choiceen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/mic.4.1.142
dc.identifier.volume4en
dc.identifier.startpage142en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue1en
dc.description.versionPublished version of EUI ECO WP 2010/14en


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