dc.contributor.author | JACKSON, Matthew O. | |
dc.contributor.author | RODRIGUEZ-BARRAQUER, Tomas | |
dc.contributor.author | TAN, Xu | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-04-01T13:22:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-04-01T13:22:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 198-216 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1090-2473 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/30797 | |
dc.description.abstract | We prove that for any equilibrium of a (Bayesian) game, and any sequence of perturbations of that game, there exists a corresponding sequence of ex-ante e-equilibria converging to the given equilibrium of the original game. We strengthen the conclusion to show that the approaching equilibria are interim e-equilibria (e-best responses for almost all types) if beliefs in the perturbed games converge in a strong-enough sense to the limit beliefs. Therefore, equilibrium selection arguments that are based on perturbations to a game are not robust to slight perturbations in best reply behavior (or to underlying preferences). This applies to many standard equilibrium selections, including Selten's (1975) definition of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, Rubinstein's (1989) analysis of the electronic mail game, and Carlsson and van Damme's (1993) global games analysis, among others | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | en |
dc.title | Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.007 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 75 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 198 | en |
dc.identifier.endpage | 216 | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en |