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dc.contributor.authorCAMBINI, Carlo 
dc.contributor.authorSILVESTRI, Virginia 
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-14T13:27:29Z
dc.date.available2014-04-14T13:27:29Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationInformation Economics and Policy, 2012, Vol. 24, No. 3-4, pp. 212-230en
dc.identifier.issn0167-6245
dc.identifier.issn1873-5975
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/31179
dc.descriptionFirst published online: December 2013en
dc.description.abstractA vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator) compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all urban areas with similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access regulation regimes – full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network is regulated), risk sharing – on investment incentives and social welfare. We find that, when the alternative for the OLO is using the copper network rather than leaving the market entirely, exclusion of the OLO does not necessarily happen in equilibrium even when the incumbent is better in offering value-added services. Risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofInformation Economics and Policyen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/21477
dc.titleTechnology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertaintyen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.infoecopol.2012.08.003
dc.identifier.volume24en
dc.identifier.startpage212en
dc.identifier.endpage230en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue3-4en
dc.description.versionPublished version of EUI RSCAS WP 2012/15en


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