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Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining

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https://hdl.handle.net/1814/32593
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1725-6704
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2012
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Working Paper
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Alternating offers; Bargaining; Bargaining power; Behavioral economics; Envy; Equity; Fairness; Inequality aversion; Negotiation; Social preferences; C72; C78; C91; D03; D31; D63
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http://hdl.handle.net/1814/27195
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KOHLER, Stefan, Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining, EUI ECO - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/32593
Abstract
Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend Rubinstein (1982)’s original solution of the bargaining problem for two self-interested bargainers to this strategic situation. Bargainers still reach agreement in the first period and their bargaining shares increase in the strength of their own envy.
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