Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining
Title: Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining
Author: KOHLER, Stefan
Series/Number: EUI ECO
Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend Rubinstein (1982)’s original solution of the bargaining problem for two self-interested bargainers to this strategic situation. Bargainers still reach agreement in the first period and their bargaining shares increase in the strength of their own envy.
Subject: Alternating offers; Bargaining; Bargaining power; Behavioral economics; Envy; Equity; Fairness; Inequality aversion; Negotiation; Social preferences; C72; C78; C91; D03; D31; D63
Type of Access: openAccess; openAccess
Published version: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/27195