Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining

dc.contributor.author	KOHLER, Stefan
dc.date.accessioned	2014-09-11T12:56:34Z
dc.date.available	2014-09-11T12:56:34Z
dc.date.issued	2012
dc.identifier.issn	1725-6704
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1814/32593
dc.description.abstract	Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend Rubinstein (1982)’s original solution of the bargaining problem for two self-interested bargainers to this strategic situation. Bargainers still reach agreement in the first period and their bargaining shares increase in the strength of their own envy.	en
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	EUI ECO	en
dc.relation.hasversion	http://hdl.handle.net/1814/27195
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	en
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	Alternating offers	en
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	Bargaining power	en
dc.subject	Behavioral economics	en
dc.subject	Envy	en
dc.subject	Equity	en
dc.subject	Fairness	en
dc.subject	Inequality aversion	en
dc.subject	Negotiation	en
dc.subject	Social preferences	en
dc.subject	C72	en
dc.subject	C78	en
dc.subject	C91	en
dc.subject	D03	en
dc.subject	D31	en
dc.subject	D63	en
dc.title	Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
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