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dc.contributor.authorROUSAKIS, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-27T16:12:03Z
dc.date.available2014-11-27T16:12:03Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/33611
dc.descriptionThis version supersedes earlier versions circulated between 2009 and 2013 and titled “Capitalizing Implementation Cycles” and “Implementation Cycles: Investment-Specific Technological Change and the Length of Patents.”en
dc.description.abstractThis article evaluates the effects of patent rights on the timing of innovation. As in Shleifer (1986), firms in different sectors receive cost-saving ideas exogenously and sequentially, from which they can make temporary monopoly profits. In the presence of sectoral demand externalities, firms might opt to postpone the implementation of their ideas so that they innovate together with firms from other sectors. I show that a prolongation of patent rights limits the appeal of this possibility, and, for ideas which are not too radical, it can lead to a welfare improvement.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2014/24en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject.lcshPatent rightsen
dc.subject.lcshTiming of innovationen
dc.subject.lcshImplementation cycles with capitalen
dc.subject.lcshTemporary monopoliesen
dc.subject.lcshDemand externalitiesen
dc.subject.lcshMultiple equilibriaen
dc.subject.lcshD43en
dc.subject.lcshE32en
dc.subject.lcshO3en
dc.titleThe length of patents and the timing of innovationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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