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dc.contributor.authorGOTTARDI, Piero
dc.contributor.authorRAHI, Rohit
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-04T16:34:46Z
dc.date.available2014-12-04T16:34:46Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationInternational Economic Review, 2014, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 57–81
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598
dc.identifier.issn1468-2354
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/33681
dc.description.abstractWe study the value of public information in competitive economies with incomplete markets. We show that generically the welfare effect of a change in the information available prior to trading can be in any direction : There exist changes in information that make all agents better off and changes for which all agents are worse off. In contrast, for any change in information, a Pareto improvement is feasible, that is, attainable by a planner facing the same informational and asset market constraints as agents. In this sense, the response of competitive markets to changes in information is typically not socially optimal.
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Economic Review
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/14440
dc.titleValue of information in competitive economies with incomplete markets
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/iere.12041
dc.identifier.volume55
dc.identifier.startpage57
dc.identifier.endpage81
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.description.versionPublished version of EUI ECO WP 2010/34


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