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dc.contributor.authorESCRESA GUILLERMO, Laarni
dc.contributor.authorGAROUPA, Nuno
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-04T16:34:50Z
dc.date.available2014-12-04T16:34:50Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationAsian journal of political science, 2013, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 189-212
dc.identifier.issn0218-5377
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/33717
dc.description.abstractIt has been argued that, under certain conditions, judges are motivated to engage in strategic defection against their appointer once they perceive the latter to be losing effective power. This behaviour should generate a clustering of decisions unfavourable to the incumbent administration at the end of their term, when they are perceived to be weak. In this article we investigate empirically the application of the strategic defection model on the Philippine Supreme Court in the period 1986-2010. Our results do not seem to strongly corroborate this model. We discuss these empirical results in the context of the Philippines' unstable democracy and general implications for comparative judicial politics.
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofAsian journal of political science
dc.titleTesting the logic of strategic defection : the case of the Philippine supreme court - an empirical analysis (1986-2010)
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/02185377.2013.823802
dc.identifier.volume21
dc.identifier.startpage189
dc.identifier.endpage212
dc.identifier.issue2


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