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dc.contributor.authorDEVORE, Marc
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-04T16:34:54Z
dc.date.available2014-12-04T16:34:54Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationComparative strategy, 2012, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 56-83
dc.identifier.issn0149-5933
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/33741
dc.description.abstractReacting to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, two European states, the United Kingdom and France, contributed large forces and participated in land, air, and sea operations. The contributions of these states varied considerably in their composition and role. The United Kingdom deployed as many forces (45,000 personnel) as the country could manage, while France sent a significant force (15,000) that fell short of its potential. Once in Arabia, the British played a major role in coalition planning, while the fr remained operationally aloof. Finally, when it came to launch offensive operations, British forces were central to the coalition's riskiest endeavors, such as special forces raids and preparing a fake amphibious invasion, while fr forces played a credible, but less dangerous role. This article tests the ability of realism and historic institutionalism to explain these different responses to the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis. Although realism appears a priori to possess a high degree of explanatory power, a detailed process tracing analysis reveals that historical institutionalism can better account for the different outcomes observed.
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofComparative strategy
dc.titleArmed forces, states, and threats : institutions and the British and fr responses to the 1991 Gulf War
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/01495933.2012.647524
dc.identifier.volume31
dc.identifier.startpage56
dc.identifier.endpage83
dc.identifier.issue1


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