No margin, no mission? : a field experiment on incentives for public service delivery
Title: No margin, no mission? : a field experiment on incentives for public service delivery
Series/Number: EUI MWP LS; 2014/08
We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effect of extrinsic rewards, both financial and non-financial, on the performance of agents recruited by a public health organization to promote HIV prevention and sell condoms. In this setting: (i) non-financial rewards are effective at improving performance; (ii) the effect of both types of rewards is stronger for pro-socially motivated agents; and (iii) both types of rewards are effective when their relative value is high. The findings illustrate that extrinsic rewards can improve the performance of agents engaged in public service delivery, and that non-financial rewards can be effective in settings where the power of financial incentives is limited.
Subject: Financial incentives; Non-monetary rewards; Pro-social motivation; Public service delivery; J33; O15; M52; D82
The lecture was delivered by Oriana Bandiera on 19 November 2014.
Type of Access: openAccess