The politics of bank bailouts
Title: The politics of bank bailouts
Author: REINKE, Raphael
Citation: Florence : European University Institute, 2014
Series/Number: EUI PhD theses; Department of Political and Social Sciences
In this thesis, I show that governments bail out banks because banks are critical to capitalist democracies. Banks enjoy a public safety net. Governments, however, can make banks pay for this protection. Two of this dissertation’s conclusions stand out. The first is that the influence of business through lobbying and other channels of instrumental power is exaggerated. Banks cannot secure sweetheart deals by pointing to their track record of campaign contributions. Bailouts are not for sale. During crises, governments can use banks’ dependence on the domestic market to force them to bear the bailout costs. Only highly international banks, can parry this threat by using their structural power strategically. The second conclusion is that financial crises remove veto points. They create a large threat and leave little time for deliberation, which prompts lawmakers defer to the executive branch. Thus, financial crises shift power from legislatures—even strong ones, like the US Congress—to the head of government.
LC Subject Heading: Bailouts (Government policy); Bank failures -- Government policy; Banks and banking
Defence date: 24 November 2014; Examining Board: Professor Pepper D. Culpepper, European University Institute (Supervisor); Professor Mark Hallerberg, Hertie School of Governance; Professor Ellen M. Immergut, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin; Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute.
Type of Access: embargoedAccess