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dc.contributor.authorVAZQUEZ, Miguel
dc.contributor.authorHALLACK, Michelle
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-19T18:00:13Z
dc.date.available2014-12-19T18:00:13Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationEnergy policy, 2013, Vol. 63, No.  , pp. 484-493
dc.identifier.issn0301-4215
dc.identifier.issn1873-6777
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/34025
dc.description.abstractIn the EU, gas markets are based on socializing network flexibility services. However, shippers have different preferences on network flexibility, which are not reflected in current allocation models. We propose the introduction of auction mechanisms to allocate network services in the short run. The auction aims to represent simultaneously the diversity of players' preferences and the trade-offs implied by network constraints. Two sealed-bid auctions are proposed: (a) an auction based on bids for gas, which allocates network services through the minimization of gas price differences; (b) an auction with explicit bids for line-pack, which allows shippers' valuation of line-pack storage.
dc.language.isoEn
dc.publisherElsevier Sci Ltd
dc.relation.ispartofEnergy policy
dc.subjectAuction design
dc.subjectEntry/exit capacity allocation
dc.subjectCombinatorial auctions
dc.subjectWind power
dc.subjecttransmission
dc.subjectnetworks
dc.subjectschemes
dc.titleNeed and design of short-term auctions in the EU gas markets
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.enpol.2013.08.006
dc.identifier.volume63
dc.identifier.startpage484
dc.identifier.endpage493
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