| dc.description.abstract | This book is the first to provide a multilevel, comparative, interdisciplinary, and practical analysis of the legal aspects pertaining to the accountability of FRSAs. Its points of reference include pre- and post-crisis regulatory schemes in three comparable but diverse jurisdictions (Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America), in the European Union, and in three international networks of FRSAs. The study evaluates and critiques the financial supervision architectures and reforms undertaken during the period 2009–2013. Centering his analysis on the various roles that legislatures, governments, and stakeholders (the financial industry, consumers, society at large) play as forums and actors to which FRSAs are accountable, the author engages with the following issues and much more: • legal, political, and economic reasons behind differences in statutory approaches to FRSAs’ accountability; • models of accountability emerging from post-crisis overhauls; • complementarities between the accountability structures operating at different jurisdictional levels and between instruments of accountability; • reporting and disclosure duties of FRSAs; and • participation of stakeholders in financial policymaking. The analysis includes abundant examples of applications of accountability mechanisms in different jurisdictions, such as appointment procedures of the heads of FRSAs, instances of judicial or quasi-judicial challenge of FRSAs’ decisions, and claims for damages brought against FRSAs. Quantitative data is used where appropriate. The multilevel analysis – comparative, European, international – provides a comprehensive overview of the accountability of FRSAs and permits a comparison among different levels of regulation. The study sheds clear light on the impact of the FRSAs’ accountability on the soundness of financial markets, the protection of investors, the stability of the financial system, and democratic control and justice. It also assesses whether and how post-financial crisis reforms have addressed the accountability shortcomings of the pre-crisis setting. For all of these reasons, it will be warmly welcomed by lawyers, academics, and policymakers working in financial services and related fields. | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | -- Preface.
-- Acknowledgments.
-- CHAPTER 1 The Accountability of Financial Regulation and Supervision Authorities: The Defining Elements.
-- Part I The Accountability of Financial Regulation and Supervision Authorities in Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
-- CHAPTER 2 The Structures of Financial Regulation and Supervision in Spain, the UK and the US.
-- CHAPTER 3 The Accountability of FRSAs towards Political Forums in Spain, the UK and the US.
-- CHAPTER 4 The Accountability of FRSAs towards Stakeholders in Spain, the UK and the US.
-- Part II The Accountability of the European Supervision Authorities in the Financial Field and of the European Systemic Risk Board.
-- CHAPTER 5 The Post-financial Crisis European Financial Supervision Architecture and the Need for Enhanced Accountability.
-- CHAPTER 6 The Accountability of the European Supervision Authorities in the Financial Field towards Political Forums.
-- CHAPTER 7 The Accountability of the European Supervision Authorities in the Financial Field towards Stakeholders.
-- Part III The Accountability of International Networks of Financial Regulation and Supervision Authorities.
-- CHAPTER 8 International Networks of Financial Regulation and Supervision Authorities as Global Standard-Setters.
-- CHAPTER 9 The Accountability of International Networks of Financial Regulation and Supervision Authorities.
-- Concluding Remarks.
-- Index. | en |
