Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMAVROIDIS, Petros C.
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-28T14:09:02Z
dc.date.available2015-05-28T14:09:02Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/35980
dc.description.abstractThe WTO Dispute Settlement System aimed to curb unilateralism by establishing a multilateral process operating under the aegis of the WTO as the exclusive forum for WTO adjudication. Intuitively, one would expect that those negatively affected by the curtailing of their power to unilaterally do justice for themselves, would agree to multilateral resolution of disputes if the established regime could guarantee enforcement of obligations in comparable terms (to unilateral enforcement). In this perspective, respect and guarantee of reciprocal commitments is the key ingredient. Reciprocal commitments entered should not be unilaterally undone through the commission of illegalities. There are good reasons to doubt whether the WTO regime as it now stands guarantees reciprocity following the commitment of illegalities. It is probably more accurate to argue that the WTO regime serves ‘diffuse’ as opposed to ‘specific’ reciprocity. Still, WTO Members continue to routinely submit their disputes to the WTO adjudicating fora, lending support to the argument that the regime after all, was meant to curb punishment, and not to punish.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2015/34en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGlobal Governance Programme-169en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGlobal Economicsen
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/38657
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectK40en
dc.subject.otherTrade, investment and international cooperation
dc.titleDispute settlement in the WTO (mind over matter)en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


Files associated with this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record