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dc.contributor.authorCLOSA, Carlos
dc.contributor.authorPALESTINI CÉSPEDES, Stefano
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-04T09:42:28Z
dc.date.available2015-12-04T09:42:28Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/38064
dc.description.abstractContrary to the assumption that the adoption and formalization of democratic protection mechanisms by regional organizations contribute per se to democratic consolidation, this article argues that the performance of those mechanism is tied to the interests of governments that are both their rule makers and their enforcers in concrete political crises. Governments design democratic protection mechanisms minimizing the probabilities that they could escape their discretionary control contributing to the paradoxical result that the provisions end up enforcing regime stability rather than democracy. We illustrate this claim with the intervention of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) in the post-Chávez Venezuela paying specific attention to two mechanisms: the democratic protocol and the electoral council. The structural bias in favor of the incumbent governments is not an exclusive tension of Unasur, and it should be systematically analyzed in the comparative studies and assessments of the link between regional organizations and democracy.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2015/93en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGlobal Governance Programme-206en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEuropean, Transnational and Global Governanceen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectRegional organizationsen
dc.subjectDemocratic clausesen
dc.subjectDemocratic protectionen
dc.subjectVenezuelaen
dc.subjectUnasuren
dc.subject.otherComparative regional integration and regionalism
dc.titleBetween democratic protection and self-defense : the case of Unasur and Venezuelaen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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