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dc.contributor.authorBLOCK, Juan I.
dc.contributor.authorLEVINE, David K.
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-09T10:07:20Z
dc.date.available2016-03-09T10:07:20Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationInternational journal of game theory, 2016, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 971–984
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276
dc.identifier.issn1432-1270
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/39294
dc.descriptionPublished online : 1 September 2015
dc.description.abstractWe examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen
dc.relation.ispartofInternational journal of game theory
dc.relation.ispartofInternational journal of game theory
dc.titleCodes of conduct, private information and repeated games
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2
dc.identifier.volume45
dc.identifier.startpage971
dc.identifier.endpage984
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dc.identifier.issue4


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