dc.contributor.author | BLOCK, Juan I. | |
dc.contributor.author | LEVINE, David K. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-03-09T10:07:20Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-03-09T10:07:20Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.identifier.citation | International journal of game theory, 2016, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 971–984 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-7276 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1432-1270 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/39294 | |
dc.description | Published online : 1 September 2015 | |
dc.description.abstract | We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting. | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Springer Verlag | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | International journal of game theory | |
dc.relation.ispartof | International journal of game theory | |
dc.title | Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 45 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 971 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 984 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | |