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dc.contributor.authorALLEN, Franklin
dc.contributor.authorCARLETTI, Elena
dc.contributor.authorQIAN, Jun
dc.contributor.authorVALENZUELA, Patricio
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-09T17:20:40Z
dc.date.available2016-03-09T17:20:40Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationJournal of financial economics, 2015, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 601-619
dc.identifier.issn0304-405X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/39618
dc.descriptionPublished online: 20 November 2014
dc.description.abstractIn a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the cost of equity and deposit finance for banks. Despite risk neutrality, equity capital earns a higher expected return than direct investment in risky assets. Banks hold positive capital to reduce bankruptcy costs, but there is a role for capital regulation when deposits are insured. Banks may no longer use capital when they lend to firms rather than invest directly in risky assets. This depends on whether the firms are public and compete with banks for equity capital, or private with exogenous amounts of capital.
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of financial economics
dc.titleDeposits and bank capital structure
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.11.003
dc.identifier.volume18
dc.identifier.startpage601
dc.identifier.endpage619
dc.identifier.issue3


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