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dc.contributor.authorD’AVINO, Carmela
dc.contributor.authorLUCCHETTA, Marcella
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-11T16:52:08Z
dc.date.available2016-03-11T16:52:08Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationBanks and bank systems, 2012, No. 4, pp. 1-25
dc.identifier.issn1816-7403
dc.identifier.issn1991-7074
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/39694
dc.description.abstractIn absence of risk-taking behavior of banks, opacity is defined as the inability of depositors, speculators and central banker to disentangle default risk and asset return from a signal on the asset’s expected value. This paper introduces opacity in the bank-run model proposed by Allen and Gale (1998). The authors show the conditions under which opacity leads to a no-run equilibrium of an insolvent bank and to an inefficient central bank’s policy response. The model can be useful to explain how opacity hindered the smooth implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program in 2008.
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofBanks and Bank Systems
dc.relation.urihttp://businessperspectives.org/journals_free/bbs/2012/BBS_en_2012_04_DAvino.pdf
dc.titleOpacity of banks and inefficient bank management : an analysis
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.startpage1
dc.identifier.endpage25
dc.identifier.issue4


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