Date: 2012
Type: Article
The case for leverage : based corporate human rights responsibility
Business ethics quarterly, 2012, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 63-98
WOOD, Stepan, The case for leverage : based corporate human rights responsibility, Business ethics quarterly, 2012, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 63-98
- https://hdl.handle.net/1814/39733
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
Should companies’ human rights responsibilities arise, in part, from their “leverage” – their ability to influence others’ actions through their relationships? Special Representative John Ruggie rejected this proposition in the United Nations Framework for business and human rights. I argue that leverage is a source of responsibility where there is a morally significant connection between the company and a rights-holder or rights-violator, the company is able to make a contribution to ameliorating the situation, it can do so at modest cost, and the threat to human rights is substantial. In such circumstances companies have a responsibility to exercise leverage even though they did nothing to contribute to the situation. Such responsibility is qualified, not categorical; graduated, not binary; context-specific; practicable; consistent with the social role of business; and not merely a negative responsibility to avoid harm but a positive responsibility to do good.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/39733
Full-text via DOI: 0.5840/beq20122215
ISSN: 1052-150X; 2153-3326
Files associated with this item
Files | Size | Format | View |
---|---|---|---|
There are no files associated with this item. |