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Browsing ECO Working Papers by Subject "D52"
Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Title:Risk-Sharing and Retrading in Incomplete Markets
Author(s):GOTTARDI, Piero; RAHI, RohitDate:2012Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:At a competitive equilibrium of an incomplete-markets economy agents’ marginal valuations for the tradable assets are equalized ex-ante. We characterize the finest partition of the state space conditional on which this ...
Title:Optimal Taxation and Constrained Inefficiency in an Infinite-Horizon Economy with Incomplete Markets
Author(s):GOTTARDI, Piero; KAJII, Atsushi; NAKAJIMA, TomoyukiDate:2011-01-01Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:We study the dynamic Ramsey problem of finding optimal public debt and linear taxes on capital and labor income within a tractable infinite horizon model with incomplete markets. With zero public expenditure and debt, it ...
Title:Value of Information in Competitive Economies with Incomplete Markets
Author(s):GOTTARDI, Piero; RAHI, RohitDate:2010Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:We study the value of information in a competitive economy in which agents trade in asset markets to reallocate risk. We characterize the kinds of information that allow a welfare improvement when portfolios can be freely ...
Title:Markets and Contracts
Author(s):BISIN, Alberto; GEANAKOPOLS, John; GOTTARDI, Piero; MINELLI, Enrico; POLEMARCHAKIS, HeraklesDate:2010Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of
the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit
modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over ...
Title:Stationary Equilibrium Distributions in Economies with Limited Commitment
Author(s):BROER, TobiasDate:2009Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:Limited commitment to contracts can explain imperfect risk sharing even when individuals have access to complete insurance markets. Past contributions have focused on the resulting cross-sectional distribution of consumption ...
Title:The Saving Glut Explanation of Global Imbalances. The Role of Underinvestment
Author(s):CORNELI, FlaviaDate:2009Type of Publication:Working PaperSeries/Report no.:EUI ECOAbstract:According to the “Saving Glut hypothesis”, global imbalances are caused by inefficiently high level of precautionary savings in .nancially underdeveloped regions, where agents have limited opportunity to diversify idiosyncratic ...