Browsing ECO Working Papers by Author "GOTTARDI, Piero"

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Browsing ECO Working Papers by Author "GOTTARDI, Piero"

Sort by: Order: Results:

  • Icon
    Title: Risk-sharing and contagion in networks  Author(s): CABRALES, Antonio; GOTTARDI, Piero; VEGA-REDONDO, Fernando Date: 2013 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate how the capacity of an economic system to absorb shocks depends on the specific pattern of interconnections established among financial firms. The key trade-off at work is between ...
  • Icon
    Title: Risk-Sharing and Retrading in Incomplete Markets  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; RAHI, Rohit Date: 2012 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: At a competitive equilibrium of an incomplete-markets economy agents’ marginal valuations for the tradable assets are equalized ex-ante. We characterize the finest partition of the state space conditional on which this ...
  • Icon
    Title: Dynamic Competitive Economies with Complete Markets and Collateral Constraints  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; KUBLER, Felix Date: 2012 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: In this paper we examine the competitive equilibria of a dynamic stochastic economy with complete markets and collateral constraints. We show that, provided both the set of asset payoffs and collateral levels are sufficiently ...
  • Icon
    Title: Optimal Taxation and Constrained Inefficiency in an Infinite-Horizon Economy with Incomplete Markets  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; KAJII, Atsushi; NAKAJIMA, Tomoyuki Date: 2011-01-01 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: We study the dynamic Ramsey problem of finding optimal public debt and linear taxes on capital and labor income within a tractable infinite horizon model with incomplete markets. With zero public expenditure and debt, it ...
  • Icon
    Title: Flexible Contracts  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; TALLON, Jean Marc; GHIRARDATO, Paolo Date: 2011-01-01 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. The main focus of the paper lies in the analysis of the costs of ...
  • Icon
    Title: Value of Information in Competitive Economies with Incomplete Markets  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; RAHI, Rohit Date: 2010 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: We study the value of information in a competitive economy in which agents trade in asset markets to reallocate risk. We characterize the kinds of information that allow a welfare improvement when portfolios can be freely ...
  • Icon
    Title: Equilibrium Corporate Finance  Author(s): BISIN, Alberto; GOTTARDI, Piero; RUTA, Guido Date: 2010 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: We study a general equilibrium model with production where financial markets are incomplete. At a competitive equilibrium firms take their production and financial decisions so as to maximize their value. We show that ...
  • Icon
    Title: Constrained Inefficiency and Optimal Taxation with Uninsurable Risks  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; KAJII, Atsushi; NAKAJIMA, Tomoyuki Date: 2010 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: Should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how when individuals?labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks? In a two period general equilibrium model with production, we ?rst show that ...
  • Icon
    Title: Markets and Contracts  Author(s): BISIN, Alberto; GEANAKOPOLS, John; GOTTARDI, Piero; MINELLI, Enrico; POLEMARCHAKIS, Herakles Date: 2010 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over ...
  • Icon
    Title: Illiquidity and Under-Valuation of Firms  Author(s): GALE, Douglas; GOTTARDI, Piero Date: 2009 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: We study a competitive model in which market incompleteness implies that debt-financed firms may default in some states of nature and default may lead to the sale of the firms’ assets at fire sale prices when markets are ...
  • Icon
    Title: Social Security and Risk Sharing  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; KUBLER, Felix Date: 2009 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: Social Security and Risk Sharing Piero Gottardi Felix Kubler Abstract In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system is ex-ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic ...
  • Icon
    Title: Flexible Contracts  Author(s): GOTTARDI, Piero; TALLON, Jean Marc; GHIRARDATO, Paolo Date: 2009 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by ...
  • Icon
    Title: Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies  Author(s): CABRALES, Antonio; GOTTARDI, Piero Date: 2009 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: In this paper we study, within a formal model, market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. Agents may then sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and ...
  • Icon
    Title: Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?  Author(s): ELUL, Ronel; GOTTARDI, Piero Date: 2008 Type of Publication: Working Paper Series/Report no.: EUI ECO Abstract: In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers’ past defaults. We study this provision in a model of repeated borrowing and lending with moral hazard and adverse selection. We ...