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dc.contributor.authorBORTOLOTTI, Bernardo
dc.contributor.authorCAMBINI, Carlo
dc.contributor.authorRONDI, Laura
dc.contributor.authorSPIEGEL, Yossi
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-15T13:45:59Z
dc.date.available2016-03-15T13:45:59Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationJournal of economics & management strategy, 2011, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 517-564
dc.identifier.issn1530-9134
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/40152
dc.description.abstractWe study the effect of ownership structure and regulatory independence on the interaction between capital structure and regulated prices using a comprehensive panel data of publicly traded European utilities. We find that firms in our sample tend to have a higher leverage if they are privately controlled and regulated by an independent regulatory agency. Moreover, the leverage of these firms has a positive and significant effect on their regulated prices, but not vice versa. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately controlled regulated firms use leverage strategically to obtain better regulatory outcomes.
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of economics & management strategy
dc.titleCapital structure and regulation : do ownership and regulatory independence matter?
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00296.x
dc.identifier.volume20
dc.identifier.startpage517
dc.identifier.endpage564
dc.identifier.issue2


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