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dc.contributor.authorBELLOC, Filippo
dc.contributor.authorNICITA, Antonio
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-15T13:46:19Z
dc.date.available2016-03-15T13:46:19Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/40270
dc.description.abstractWe empirically investigate the political determinants of deregulation policies in six network industries of 30 OECD countries over 1975-2007. We unbundle privatization and liberalization and propose an econometric study in which we allow for the joint adoption of the two policies by governments. We find, contrary to conventional wisdom, that right-wing executives tend to privatize more and to liberalize less, relative to left-wing governments. Thus, we show that ideological cleavages affect the ‘structure’ of deregulation, i.e. the way in which liberalization and privatization are combined. This result may shed new lights on the analysis of the political determinants of market-oriented policy, and suggest new issues for further theoretical and empirical research.
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUNIMI Departmental Working Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2011/32en
dc.relation.urihttp://wp.demm.unimi.it/tl_files/wp/2011/DEMM-2011_032wp.pdf
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleLiberalization-privatization paths : policies and politics
dc.typeWorking Paper


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