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dc.contributor.authorMARIN, Dalia
dc.contributor.authorVERDIER, Thierry
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-07T08:34:48Z
dc.date.available2016-07-07T08:34:48Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationEconomic theory, 2009, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 437-464
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.issn1432-0479
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/42217
dc.descriptionFirst online: 12 January 2008
dc.description.abstractRecent theories of the multinational corporation introduce the property rights model of the firm and examine whether to integrate or outsource firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focuses instead on the internal organization of the multinational corporation by examining the power allocation between headquarters and subsidiaries. We provide a framework to analyse the interaction between the decision to serve the local market by exporting or FDI, market access and the optimal mode of organization of the multinational corporation. We find that subsidiary managers are given decision power to run the firm at intermediate levels of host country competition. We then provide comparative statics on the optimal organization of the multinational corporation for changes in fixed FDI entry costs, trade costs, as well as changes in information technology.
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic theory
dc.titlePower in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-007-0327-3
dc.identifier.volume38
dc.identifier.startpage437
dc.identifier.endpage464
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dc.identifier.issue3


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