| dc.contributor.author | DEMETRIOU, Chares | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-07T08:34:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-07-07T08:34:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Philosophy of the social sciences, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 440-462 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0048-3931 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1552-7441 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/42227 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The mechanism-realist paradigm in the philosophy of science, championed by Mario Bunge and Roy Bhaskar, sets certain expectations for the substantive social-scientific application of the paradigm. To evaluate the application of the paradigm in accomplished substantive research, as well as the potential for future research, I examine the work of Charles Tilly, the exemplary substantive work in the mechanism-realist tradition. Based on this examination, I argue for the usefulness of explanatory mechanisms, provided that they are couched in terms of a heuristic. Such a position is the most reasonable one to adopt given the expectations set by the paradigm in relation to complexity stemming from mechanism interaction and to a notion of causality that is deeper than that acknowledged by empiricism and positivism. | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Philosophy of the social sciences | |
| dc.title | The realist approach to explanatory mechanisms in social sciences : more than a heuristic? | |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1177/0048393108329268 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 39 | |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 440 | |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 462 | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 3 | |