Backstage behaviour? : lobbyists in public and private settings in Sweden and the European Union
Title: Backstage behaviour? : lobbyists in public and private settings in Sweden and the European Union
Author: NAURIN, Daniel
Citation: Comparative politics, 2007, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 209-228
Union According to deliberative democratic theory, transparency and publicity have a civilizing effect on political behavior, forcing actors to argue with regard to the public rather than engage in self-interested bargaining. Negotiation theory, in contrast, warns that transparency may damage effective problem solving and lead to sharper group polarization. Comparison of business lobbyists acting in institutional settings with varying degrees of transparency in Sweden and the European Union can test these theories. The results support negotiation theory. However, the deliberative perspective is also necessary to explain the behavior of lobbyists backstage, and standard two level games will often be inadequate in explaining transparency effects.
Files in this item
There are no files associated with this item.