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dc.contributor.authorTATHAM, Michael Robert
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-10T09:17:45Z
dc.date.available2016-10-10T09:17:45Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationOxford : Oxford University Press, Transformations in governanceen
dc.identifier.isbn9780198758624
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/43584
dc.descriptionThe author was awarded UACES Best Book Prize 2017 'for the book that has made the most substantial and original contribution to knowledge in the area of contemporary European Studies'
dc.description.abstractMuch research has highlighted that sub-state entities (SSEs) - such as the German Länder, the Spanish autonomous communities, or the French regions - mobilise at the European level. This literature, however, is silent on how this sub-state activity interacts with that of its own member state. Do SSEs lobby in Brussels with their member state (cooperation), without their member state (non-interaction), or against their member state (conflict)? This book fills the current research gap by identifying what pattern of interaction between state and sub-state EU interest representation corresponds to, and by identifying what the determinants of such a pattern are. To achieve this, both quantitative and qualitative methods are employed. The quantitative section consists of regression analysis on data collected through a survey addressed to heads of regional offices in Brussels, and highlights that cooperation is the most frequent outcome, followed by non-interaction. Conflicting interest representation is the least frequent outcome. Further analysis reveals that devolution levels do not affect conflict but increase the frequency of cooperation and decrease that of non-interaction. Meanwhile, party political incongruence fails to affect conflict, decreases cooperation, and increases non-interaction. This quantitative work is complemented by a series of in-depth case study analyses of Scotland (UK), Salzburg (Austria), Rhône-Alpes and Alsace (both France). Based on over a hundred semi-structured interviews, the case studies, along with additional statistical testing, confirm the overall findings reached through quantitative means and further suggest that the effect of devolution overrides that of party political incongruence.en
dc.description.tableofcontents1: Regions and the Brussels Game 2: Research question, Hypotheses, and Theoretical Framework 3: Paradiplomacy with Adjectives? Revisiting Sub-State Interest representation in Brussels 4: Qualitative Design and Data 5: The UK Laboratory 6: France, Alsace, and Rhône-Alpes 7: Austria and Salzburg 8: State and Sub-State Interest Representation: Results from a Mixed Methods Approach 9: Conclusionsen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/14983en
dc.titleWith, without, or against the state? : how European regions play the Brussels gameen
dc.typeBooken
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.description.versionPublished version of EUI PhD thesis, 2010en


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