Which One Should I Imitate?

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dc.contributor.author SCHLAG, Karl H.
dc.date.accessioned 2006-05-27T11:40:14Z
dc.date.available 2006-05-27T11:40:14Z
dc.date.issued 1999
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999, 31, 4, 493-522. en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/4460
dc.description.abstract An individual repeatedly faces the same decision. Payoffs generated by his available actions are noisy. This individual forgets earlier experience and is limited to learn by observing current success of two other individuals. We select among behavioral rules that lead an infinite population of identical individuals in the long run to the expected payoff maximizing action. Optimal behavior requires learning by imitation. The second most successful in a sample must sometimes be imitated although the most successful will always be imitated with a higher probability. Inertia is optimal. When each individual follows an optimal rule, then the population evolves according to an aggregate monotone dynamic. en
dc.format.extent 1324 bytes
dc.format.mimetype text/richtext
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Mathematical Economics
dc.title Which One Should I Imitate? en
dc.type Article en
dc.neeo.contributor SCHLAG|Karl H.|aut|
dc.identifier.volume 31
dc.identifier.startpage 493
dc.identifier.endpage 522

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