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dc.contributor.authorBATTIGALLI, Pierpaolo
dc.contributor.authorSINISCALCHI, Marciano
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-27T11:58:23Z
dc.date.available2006-05-27T11:58:23Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, 1999, 88, 1, 188-230.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/4461
dc.description.abstractThe epistemic analysis of solution concepts for dynamic games involves statements about the players' beliefs conditional upon different histories of play, their conditional beliefs about each other's conditional beliefs, etc. To represent such statements, we construct a space of infinite (coherent) hierarchies of conditional probability systems, defined with respect to a fixed collection of relevant hypotheses concerning an external state (e.g., the strategy profile being played.) As an application, we derive results about common certainty of the opponent's rationality conditonal on an arbitrary collection of histories in multistage games with observed actions and (possibly) incomplete information.en
dc.format.extent1324 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/richtext
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Theory
dc.titleHierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Gamesen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.neeo.contributorBATTIGALLI|Pierpaolo|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorSINISCALCHI|Marciano|aut|
dc.identifier.volume88
dc.identifier.startpage188
dc.identifier.endpage230


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