Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games

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dc.contributor.author BATTIGALLI, Pierpaolo
dc.contributor.author SINISCALCHI, Marciano
dc.date.accessioned 2006-05-27T11:58:23Z
dc.date.available 2006-05-27T11:58:23Z
dc.date.issued 1999
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, 88, 1, 188-230. en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/4461
dc.description.abstract The epistemic analysis of solution concepts for dynamic games involves statements about the players' beliefs conditional upon different histories of play, their conditional beliefs about each other's conditional beliefs, etc. To represent such statements, we construct a space of infinite (coherent) hierarchies of conditional probability systems, defined with respect to a fixed collection of relevant hypotheses concerning an external state (e.g., the strategy profile being played.) As an application, we derive results about common certainty of the opponent's rationality conditonal on an arbitrary collection of histories in multistage games with observed actions and (possibly) incomplete information. en
dc.format.extent 1324 bytes
dc.format.mimetype text/richtext
dc.language.iso en en
dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Theory
dc.title Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games en
dc.type Article en
dc.neeo.contributor BATTIGALLI|Pierpaolo|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor SINISCALCHI|Marciano|aut|
dc.identifier.volume 88
dc.identifier.startpage 188
dc.identifier.endpage 230


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