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dc.contributor.authorBATTIGALLI, Pierpaolo
dc.contributor.authorSINISCALCHI, Marciano
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-27T12:04:28Z
dc.date.available2006-05-27T12:04:28Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.identifier.citationResearch in Economics, 1999, 53, 3, 247-273.en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/4462
dc.description.abstractWe use a universal, extensive form interactive beliefs system to provide an epistemic characterization of a weak and a strong notion of rationalizability with independent beliefs. The weak solution concept is equivalent to backward induction in generic perfect information games where no player moves more than once in any play. The strong solution concept is related to explicability (Reny,[22]) and is outcome-equivalent to backward induction in generic games of perfect information.en
dc.format.extent1324 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/richtext
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofResearch in Economics
dc.titleInteractive Beliefs, Epistemic Independence and Strong Rationalizabilityen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.neeo.contributorBATTIGALLI|Pierpaolo|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorSINISCALCHI|Marciano|aut|
dc.identifier.volume53
dc.identifier.startpage247
dc.identifier.endpage273


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