This research first sets out to verify whether the measures in the EU’s peacebuilding toolbox indeed turn out to have converging objectives, an overlapping scope and provide for similar activities across the CFSP / non-CFSP divide. Does the European Union live up to expectations as to the extensiveness of the range of its tools? And, if in the affirmative, do they have the potential to leave a substantial and sustainable impact? These tools include primarily the non-CFSP external assistance instruments, on the one hand, and EU operations under the aegis of the CFSP, on the other. Both are presented in detail in order precisely to classify their objectives on all levels, from the Treaty level to the instruments’ implementing decisions and programmes, and to identify the possible activities undertaken to this end. Underpinned by the objective of shedding light on the competence allocation in EU peacebuilding, this analysis yields questions such as: what actually is the difference between an EU contracted police officer mentoring and monitoring third country police officers in conducting an effective crime investigation according to predetermined action fiches, and an expert funded under an EU technical assistance or twinning project to establish a detailed workplan and strategy for enhancing the effectiveness of crime investigation? And what is the difference between awareness raising, training and trial monitoring with the objective of advancing in the fight against corruption, as opposed to capacity-building and financial assistance in the public sector in this respect? And does the establishment of a transparent and objective case-allocation system in the judiciary call for a non-CFSP financed project, or can it also be achieved through mentoring in the context of an EU strengthening operation?

This thesis presents a novel conceptualization of the right to personal identity: one that is adapted to the current technological environment in which we live, and that anticipates future technological developments. The study provides a comprehensive analysis of the right to personal identity, tracing its historical origins and main juridical developments from the Roman period to the present (and future) time. It also distinguishes the right to identity from other rights (such as the right to privacy and the right to data protection), thus contributing to the autonomy of this legal figure. This study puts forward a reconceptualization of the right to personal identity as a right that encompasses, controls and protects a series of different types of information related to or constitutive of our personal identity (digital, genetic, neural). Further to a right over information, the right to identity is presented as a right that regulates a series of identity movements and transformations between different ontological levels of “being” (possible <-> real; actual <-> virtual). Thus, the right to identity is the right to have one’s identity attributes registered (real <-> possible), as well as the right to be recognized and identified (possible <-> real) according to those defining features. The right to identity also encompasses the right to be represented as one wishes (virtual ?? actual) – that is, the right not to be misrepresented; the right to multiple identities (virtual <-> actual) – that is, the right to create, control and uphold different identities in digital environments (such as pseudonyms and heteronyms); and the right to delete and recreate oneself (actual <-> virtual), an identity movement that encompasses the right to be forgotten (and, consequently, the right to start again), as well as the eventual right to undergo genetic (post-human) and neural (memoryediting/ deletion) transformations. Following a postmodern conception of identity (as antiessentialistic, dynamic and multiple), the right to personal identity is defined as the right to be unique and different, not only from others but also from oneself. Further to this theoretical framework, the thesis also presents the foundations for an identity-regulatory system that grants the individual with the necessary and operational means to manage, control, change or delete his or her identity(ies).

This thesis addresses the question of when the European Union is internationally responsible. More precisely, it examines the extent to which the European Union and its Member States bear responsibility for the violations of an international agreement committed as a consequence of the implementation of EU Law. The specific features of the multilevel system implementation of EU Law poses a series of very interesting questions as regards the EU’s relations with its Member States and their responsibility under International Law. The EU primarily implements its law through its Member States’ authorities. As such, should the EU bear responsibility for a violation committed by a Member State organ because it was implementing EU Law? Should a Member State which, in complying with a piece of EU legislation, violated an international obligation be held liable? This thesis examines these questions from a practical perspective. It examines how international bodies approach the issue. In this regard, the thesis sets out to examine whether there is a common thread in the way international courts and tribunals deal with the EU’s international responsibility. The thesis is structured in four parts. Part I identifies the basic issues surrounding the responsibility of the EU and its Member States under international law, by examining the context and the main issues both at the international level and domestic level. Part II of the thesis focuses on the main mechanism used by the EU to deal with its international responsibility. More specifically it addresses the question of whether the division of competence is a good way to establish the EU’s responsibility under an international agreement. Part III of the thesis continues with a practical examination of the EU’s responsibility. It examines how international courts and tribunals establish the EU‘s international responsibility in absence of any declaration limiting its competence. Part IV summarizes the conclusions of Parts I, II and III and contains a series of concluding remarks on the issue of the EU’s international responsibility and future developments.