Top-down self-organization: state logics, substitutional delegation, and private governance in Russia
Title: Top-down self-organization: state logics, substitutional delegation, and private governance in Russia
Author: HEDBERG, Masha
Citation: Governance, 2016, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 67-83
This study investigates the counterintuitive emergence of self-regulation in the Russian construction sector. Despite its proclivity for centralizing political authority, the government acted as the catalyst for the delegation of regulatory powers to private industry groups. The article argues that a factor little considered in extant literature—namely, a weak and corrupt bureaucracy—is key to explaining why the normally control-oriented executive branch began to promote private governance despite industry's preference for continued state regulation. The article's signal contribution is to theoretically explain and empirically demonstrate how a government's prior inability to establish intrastate control over an ineffective and bribable public bureaucracy creates incentives for political authorities to search for alternative means for policy implementation outside of existing state agencies. These findings are important for understanding the impetus and logic behind particular regulatory shifts in countries where the state apparatus is both deficient and corrupt.
Version of Record online: 12 MAR 2015
Type of Access: openAccess
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