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dc.contributor.authorMONTI, Giorgio
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-18T16:20:00Z
dc.date.available2017-01-18T16:20:00Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationDominique RITLENG (ed.), Independence and legitimacy in the institutional system of the European Union, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016, The collected courses of the Academy of European Law ; Vol. XXIII/2, pp. 180-205en
dc.identifier.isbn9780191822629
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/44869
dc.description.abstractThis chapter suggests that the independence of a competition authority is best explained by the state’s commitment to competitive markets, and that this serves to strengthen an authority’s independence insofar as it performs in a manner that is perceived to be legitimate, because then the state will find it more difficult to rescind from its commitment. At the same time the authority must be careful when acting in economic sectors where the state’s commitment to competition is weaker. The chapter also examines, using the EU example, how the interdependence among the Commission and national competition authorities has played out: it suggests that the network of agencies serves to strengthen each other’s independence and legitimacy on the one hand, but it also notes that the European Competition Network works more as a policy network and appears to reduce the scope for diversity in enforcement tactics by national competition authorities.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.titleIndependence, Interdependence and Legitimacy : the EU Commission, National competition authorities, and the European Competition Networken
dc.typeContribution to booken
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198769798.001.0001
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198769798.003.0006


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