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dc.contributor.authorDRAEGE, Jonas Bergan
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-23T11:57:34Z
dc.date.available2017-01-23T11:57:34Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationThe Middle East journal, 2016, No. 2, pp. 189-210en
dc.identifier.issn0026-3141
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/44948
dc.description.abstractThis article investigates coalition patterns between two main factions of the Syrian opposition before and after the 2011 uprising. The two factions united over common platforms on several occasions following the 2000 Damascus Spring, but failed to do so in 2011 despite repeated domestic and international pressure. Drawing upon two-level game theory to explain this change, this article argues that increased interest from both domestic and international audiences after 2011 made the two factions less flexible in negotiating a unified platform. Thus, paradoxically, it was increased pressure for unification that deterred the opposition factions from unifying.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherMiddle East Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofThe Middle East journalen
dc.titleThe formation of Syrian opposition coalitions as two-level gamesen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.3751/70.2.11
dc.identifier.startpage189en
dc.identifier.endpage210en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue2en


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