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dc.contributor.authorMORELLI, Massimo 
dc.contributor.authorPARK, In-Uck
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-27T13:15:33Z
dc.date.available2017-01-27T13:15:33Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationGames and economic behavior, 2016, Vol. 96, pp. 90-96en
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/45026
dc.descriptionReceived 11 October 2014, Available online 26 January 2016
dc.description.abstractIn deciding whether to join a coalition or not, an agent must consider both i) the expected power of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish the existence of a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed endogenously in stable systems. We show that such coalitions can be mixed and balanced, rather than segregated, in terms of members' ability levels. In any stable system each coalition is of an efficient size and every agent is paid her marginal contribution.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofGames and economic behavioren
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/17579en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titleInternal hierarchy and stable coalition structuresen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.007
dc.identifier.volume96en
dc.identifier.startpage90en
dc.identifier.endpage96en
dc.description.versionArticle is version of EUI WP ECO; 2011/20en


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