Economic governance in Europe : comparative paradoxes and constitutional challenges
Title: Economic governance in Europe : comparative paradoxes and constitutional challenges
Author: FABBRINI, Federico
Citation: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016, Oxford studies in European law
The Euro-crisis and the legal and institutional responses to it have had important constitutional implications on the architecture of the European Union (EU). The purpose of this book is to offer a broad picture of how relations of power in the EU have changed, considering three different dimensions: 1. the vertical relations of power between the member states and the EU institutions; 2. the relations of power between the political branches and the courts; and 3. the horizontal relations of power between the EU member states themselves. As the book argues, in the aftermath of the Euro-crisis, power has been shifting along each of these axes in paradoxical ways. In particular, as a brief comparison with the United States helps to reveal, the EU is nowadays characterized by a high degree of centralization in budgetary affairs, an unprecedented level of judicialization of economic questions, and a growing imbalance between the member states in the governance of fiscal matters. As the book suggests, however, each of these dynamics is a cause for concern—calling into question important constitutional values for the EU, such as the autonomy of the member states in taking decisions about taxing and spending, the preeminence of the political process in settling economic matters, and the balance between state power and state equality. To address these issues, the book considers possible options for future legal and institutional developments in the EU, and discusses the challenges that accompany any further step toward a “more perfect” Economic and Monetary Union.
Table of Contents:
-- Introduction -- Part I Accident and Force -- 1 The Paradox of Centralization -- 2 The Paradox of Judicialization -- 3 The Paradox of Domination -- Part II Reflection and Choice -- 4 From Fiscal Constraints to Fiscal Capacity -- 5 From Legislative Sidelining to Legislative Involvement -- 6 From Executive Federalism to Executive Government -- Conclusion