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dc.contributor.authorHUGHES, Niall
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-31T14:06:15Z
dc.date.available2017-01-31T14:06:15Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationJournal of economic theory, 2016, Vol. 166, pp. 51-93en
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/45090
dc.descriptionReceived 30 June 2015, Revised 15 August 2016, Accepted 17 August 2016, Available online 24 August 2016
dc.description.abstractModels of single district plurality elections show that with three parties anything can happen – extreme policies can win regardless of voter preferences. I show that when single district elections are used to fill a legislature, we get back to a world where the median voter matters. An extreme policy will generally only come about if it is preferred to a more moderate policy by the median voter in a majority of districts. The mere existence of a centrist party can lead to moderate outcomes even if the party itself wins few seats. I also show that, while some voters in a district will not vote for their nationally preferred party, in many equilibria they will want the candidate for whom they vote to win that district. This is never the case in single district elections. There, some voters always want the candidate they voted for to lose.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of economic theoryen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/29608en
dc.titleVoting in legislative elections under plurality ruleen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.004
dc.identifier.volume166en
dc.identifier.startpage51en
dc.identifier.endpage93en
dc.description.versionArticle is based on a chapter (1) of the author's EUI PhD thesis, 2013en


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