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dc.contributor.authorWINSLETT, Gary
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-06T17:10:58Z
dc.date.available2017-02-06T17:10:58Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationThe world economy, 2016, Vol. 39, No. 8, pp. 1128-1145en
dc.identifier.issn0378-5920
dc.identifier.issn1467-9701
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/45174
dc.descriptionVersion of Record online: 26 MAY 2016en
dc.description.abstractMass public opinion has generally been presumed to have little or no impact on American trade policy. I argue against this presumption. I assert that mass public opinion significantly affects US trade policy by shaping the way the two parties compete over that trade policy. When public opinion is unbalanced, the competition between the parties is likely to resemble a bidding war. When public opinion is balanced but split in a partisan manner the competition is likely to descend into Manichean conflict. When public opinion is balanced but split in a non-partisan manner, the competition is likely to be characterised by political actors seeking to maintain the support of their core constituencies. To examine this relationship, I investigate three cases: the push to punish China over Tiananmen Square in 1989–90, the ratification of NAFTA in 1992–93 and the process through which President Bush was granted trade promotion authority in 2001–02.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.relation.ispartofThe world economyen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titlePublic opinion distribution and party competition in US trade policyen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/twec.12409
dc.identifier.volume39en
dc.identifier.startpage1128en
dc.identifier.endpage1145en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue8en


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