dc.contributor.author | WEBER, Matthias | |
dc.contributor.author | SCHRAM, Arthur | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-02-07T15:08:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.citation | The economic journal, 2017, Vol. 127, No. 604, pp. 2187–2215 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1468-0297 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0013-0133 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/45190 | |
dc.description | First published: 5 April 2017 | en |
dc.description.abstract | Under full rationality, a labour market tax levied on employers and a corresponding income tax levied on employees are equivalent. With boundedly rational agents, this equivalence is no longer obvious. In a real-effort experiment, we study the effects of these taxes on preferences concerning the size of the public sector, subjective well-being, labor supply, and on-the-job performance. Our findings suggest that employer-side taxes induce preferences for a larger public sector. Subjective well-being is higher under employer-side taxes while labor supply is lower, at least at the extensive margin. We discuss three mechanisms that may underlie these results. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | The economic journal | en |
dc.title | The non-equivalence of labour market taxes : a real-effort experiment | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/ecoj.12365 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 127 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 2187 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 2215 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 604 | |