Monetary sovereignty and the ESCB : towards a multilayered approach to the Euro-sovereignty game in the EMU

Abstract

This dissertation provides a doctrinal and “applied” overview of the main developments in the post-Maastricht transfer of monetary sovereignty from the member states to supranational institutions. In so doing, it concentrates on three areas of particular interest, complexity and tension between different forces. One area is simply the configuration of supranational institutions involved and their relationship, and in particular the tensions among the independent ECB, the national dimension of the broader ESCB and the state-dominated Ecofin Council. A second area concerns the well-known tension between monetary and broader economic union – and in particular the asymmetry between the significantly centralized monetary institutions and the retention of fiscal authority at national level. A third area concerns the internal and external dimension of monetary authority (exchange rates) from broader macro-economic consideration, and, reflecting this, the continuing absence of a definitive legal and institutional resolution of the extent of external monetary sovereignty transferred to central EU institutions. Here there emerges an analysis of the framework of good governance for the new multilayered system of monetary union. The key question addressed by the author of this study is whether the shift in monetary authority does or should involve a reconceptualization of the question of where sovereignty lies in Europe, both over monetary matters specifically or more generally.