dc.contributor.author | PRAM, Kym | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-08T14:45:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-08T14:45:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1830-7728 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/46689 | |
dc.description.abstract | I consider environments in which an agent with private information can acquire arbitrary hard evidence about his type before interacting with a principal. In a broad class of screening models, I show that there is always an evidence structure that interim Pareto improves over the no-evidence benchmark whenever some types of the agent take an outside option in the benchmark case, and additional weak conditions, including either a single-crossing condition or state-independence of the principal's payoffs, are satisfied. I show that the sufficient conditions are tight and broadly applicable. Addressing concerns about multiple equilibria, I show how a planner can restrict the available evidence to ensure that an equilibrium which interim Pareto-improves over the benchmark case is obtained. Furthermore, I show that Pareto-improving evidence can arise endogenously when agents choose what evidence to acquire (and disclose). | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI MWP | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2017/10 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.subject | Information economics | en |
dc.subject | Hard evidence | en |
dc.subject | Mechanism design | en |
dc.subject | Microeconomic theory | en |
dc.subject | Insurance | en |
dc.title | Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |