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dc.contributor.authorHAKELBERG, Lukas
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-13T13:31:12Z
dc.date.available2017-06-13T13:31:12Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationJournal of European public policy, 2015, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 409-428en
dc.identifier.issn1466-4429
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/46768
dc.descriptionPublished online: 17 Jul 2014en
dc.description.abstractLuxembourg and Austria resisted exchanging bank data on non-resident interest income with European Union (EU) partners for over a decade. In March 2014 they eventually gave in. Theories of tax competition analysts usually apply to intra-EU bargaining over taxation cannot explain their change of tack. Instead, I argue that American imposition of bilateral exchange of information on the two countries unlocked negotiations at EU level. Concessions made to the United States (US) by Luxembourg and Austria activated a most-favoured nation clause contained in an EU directive. Moreover, the US also forced third countries to exchange bank data, thus reducing the risk of capital flight from Luxembourg and Austria.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of European public policyen
dc.relation.isreplacedbyhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/44147
dc.titleThe power politics of international tax co-operation : Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of informationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/13501763.2014.941380
dc.identifier.volume22en
dc.identifier.startpage409en
dc.identifier.endpage428en
dc.identifier.issue3en


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