dc.contributor.author | HAKELBERG, Lukas | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-13T13:31:12Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-13T13:31:12Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of European public policy, 2015, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 409-428 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1466-4429 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/46768 | |
dc.description | Published online: 17 Jul 2014 | en |
dc.description.abstract | Luxembourg and Austria resisted exchanging bank data on non-resident interest income with European Union (EU) partners for over a decade. In March 2014 they eventually gave in. Theories of tax competition analysts usually apply to intra-EU bargaining over taxation cannot explain their change of tack. Instead, I argue that American imposition of bilateral exchange of information on the two countries unlocked negotiations at EU level. Concessions made to the United States (US) by Luxembourg and Austria activated a most-favoured nation clause contained in an EU directive. Moreover, the US also forced third countries to exchange bank data, thus reducing the risk of capital flight from Luxembourg and Austria. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of European public policy | en |
dc.relation.isreplacedby | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/44147 | |
dc.title | The power politics of international tax co-operation : Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of information | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/13501763.2014.941380 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 22 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 409 | en |
dc.identifier.endpage | 428 | en |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | en |