| dc.contributor.editor | ADAMS, Maurice | |
| dc.contributor.editor | FABBRINI, Federico | |
| dc.contributor.editor | LAROUCHE, Pierre | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-23T14:26:45Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-06-23T14:26:45Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2014 | en |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 9781849465809 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/46987 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The recently enacted Treaty on the Stability, Coordination and Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (generally referred to as the Fiscal Compact) has introduced a 'golden rule', which is a detailed obligation that government budgets be balanced. Moreover, it required the 25 members of the EU which signed the Treaty in March 2012, to incorporate this 'golden rule' within their national Constitutions. This requirement represents a major and unprecedented development, raising formidable challenges to the nature and legitimacy of national Constitutions as well as to the future of the European integration project. This book analyses the new constitutional architecture of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), examines in a comparative perspective the constitutionalization of budgetary rules in the legal systems of the Member States, and discusses the implications of these constitutional changes on the future of democracy and integration in the EU. By combining insights from law and economics, comparative institutional analysis and legal theory, the book offers a comprehensive survey of the constitutional incorporation of new fiscal and budgetary rules across Europe and a systematic normative discussion of the legitimacy issues at play. It thus contributes to a better understanding of the Euro-crisis, of the future of the EU, and the reforms needed towards a deeper and genuine EMU. | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | -- Introduction : the constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints: effectiveness and legitimacy in comparative perspective
-- Part 1 The new constitutional architecture of European economic and monetary union
-- Economic governance and the euro crisis: constitutional architecture and constitutional implications
-- The use of international law as a tool for enhancing governance in the Eurozone and its impact on EU institutional integrity
-- Differentiated economic governance and the reshaping of dominium law
-- EU fiscal governance and the effectiveness of its reform
-- Maastricht revisited: economic constitutionalism the ECB and the Bundesbank
-- The independence of the ECB after the economic crisis
-- Part 2 the constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints: comparative experiences
-- (Un)balanced budget rules in Europe and America
-- A legalization of financial constitutions in the EU? Reflections on the German Spanish Italian and French experiences
-- Fiscal stability rules in central European constitutions
-- Can constitutional rules even if 'golden,'tame greek public debt?
-- Mandatory balanced budget in Dutch legislation following examples abroad?
-- An analysis of the method and efficacy of Ireland's incorporation of the fiscal compact
-- Part 3 Towards a genuine EMU: democracy legitimacy and integration
-- Domestic courts constitutional constraints and European democracy: what solution for the crisis?
-- National parliaments' say on the new EU budgetary constraints: the case of Spain and Ireland
-- Who got to adjudicate the EU's finacial crisis and why? Judicial review of the legal instruments of the Eurozone
-- The impact of stronger economic policy co-ordination on the European social dimension: issues of legitimacy
-- Power and legitimacy in the Eurozone: can intergration and democracy be reconciled?
-- From fiscal constraints to fiscal capacity: the future of EMU and its challenges | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.title | The constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints | en |
| dc.type | Book | en |
