A separate parliament for the Eurozone? : differentiated representation, Brexit, and the quandary of exclusion

Abstract

This article undertakes a critical analysis of the idea of a separate parliamentary chamber for the Eurozone. Beyond the difficulty of determining the composition and powers of such a chamber, it is argued that any attempt to establish a system of differentiated parliamentary representation would encounter the quandary of exclusion: it is difficult to justify excluding non-Eurozone states altogether, but equally difficult to decide which non-Eurozone states to include. This problem is illustrated with a survey of the great variation among non-Eurozone Member States in their adherence to the institutional elements of the EU’s post-crisis economic governance regime, and with an account of the debates over participation in the one new EU parliamentary body in this field, the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance. Finally, there are reflections about the likely impact of Brexit on this problem.